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Governance structure and performance of private
family firms
Tarun Mukherjee

& Vighneshwara Swami & Wei Wang

Abstract
A debate exists on the issue of whether a governance system is value additive or even
necessary for a privately-held firm. One side of the debate suggests that, since agency
problems do not exist in a small private firm, it does not need a costly governance
system. The other side argues that a private firm indeed faces agency costs in the form of
altruism and, therefore, could extract net gains from a governance system. In this paper,
we empirically investigate whether a good governance system crates or destroys value
of private family firms. We first demonstrate that a multifamily firm encounters larger
agency costs stemming from inter-family conflicts, and therefore, has larger incentive
than a single-family firm to institute a superior governance system. We then show that a
multifamily firm, owing to its better governance system, outperforms its single-family
counterpart.

Keywords Family firms . Ownership structure . Financial performance . Governance

1 Introduction
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), a privately held firm managed by a single
owner will not incur agency costs as the conflicts of interest between the manager and

the owner do not exist. Conflicts might arise when the firm is owned by multiple
owners, However, such conflicts would be efficiently resolved as economically rational
owners have incentives to do so. Thus, formal governance mechanisms are not only
unnecessary but might be value reducing for private firms.
Schulze et al. 2001 (hereafter SLDB) challenge the notion that the agency cost of
conflicts among owners is insignificant based on the argument that owners are exclu
sively motivated by economic rationale. They argue that preferences are not expressed
in economic terms alone but in non-economic terms as well and people seek to
maximize the utility they gain from both. A major driver of the non-economically
motivated behavior is altruism which "allows the individual to simultaneously satisfy
both altruistic (other-regarding) preferences and egotistic (self-regarding) preferences”
(p. 102). The second type of altruism, the threat of self-control, often expressed in the
forms of providing secure employment as well as perquisites and privileges to family
members, is an important source of agency costs for a private firm. SLDB posit that such
a self-control problem Bis particularly troublesome when privately held firms are owned
and managed by family” (page 102). This is because control over the firm’s resources
makes it possible for a family owner-manager "to be unusually generous to their
children and relatives” (page 103). Therefore, self-control and altruism together create
a distinct set of agency problems for family-owned private firms, threatening their
performance.1 According to SLDB (2001), a good corporate governance system is
needed for private firms since additional costs of governance will outweigh the costs
of self-control and altruism. Uhlaner et al. (2007) also suggest (in reference to private
firms) that the governance plays a comprehensive role in holding management account
able, reducing downside risks, and enabling the firm to achieve its upside potential.
To sum up, the two theories offer opposite implications regarding the role of
governance for private firms: Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that governance
system is costly, and therefore, value reducing for private-held family firms, while
SLDB (2001) conclude that the benefits of the governance system outweigh its costs. In
this paper, we perform an empirical analysis to investigate whether a good governance
system crates or destroys value of privately-held small family firms.
According to SLDB (2001), both single-family as well as multiple-family2 owned
private firms can benefit from a good governance structure. However, a founder-owner of
a single-family firm might prefer maintaining control of the firm to its performance, and
thus, is less likely to impose a governance system on himself. After reviewing pertinent
literature, Daily and Dalton (1992) comment: "Extant research would suggest that founder
CEOs rely on dysfunctional governance structures (e.g., CEO duality, lower numbers of
outside directors, lower proportions of outside directors) to a greater extent than their non
founder counterparts” (p. 375). Thus, Daily and Dalton (1992) argue that a firm run by a
founder-manager is likely to be associated with decreased firm performance.3
1 Other reasons that might impact the performance of private small firms is their inability to provide
competitive compensation and promotional opportunities, resulting perhaps in hiring employees that are likely
inferior to those hired by a publicly held firm.
2 We define "family firm” as a private business that is solely owned and controlled by the founder (i.e. single
family) or by descendants of the founder (i.e., multifamily).
3 Although Daily and Dalton’s statement is in the context of publicly-held firms, it might equally apply to the
founder-manager of a privately-held firm. Who, for personal reasons as well as being exempt from the market
disciplining mechanisms, avoids a governance system that interferes with his control or questions his decisions.

A multifamily firm, on the other hand, has higher agency costs than a single
family firm, especially because of potential conflicts of interest among the
owners. According to Dyer Jr (2006), the higher agency costs of a multifamily
firm result "from opportunism, shirking, and adverse selection because of
altruism (i.e., family members fail to monitor each other)” (p. 259). Jaffe and
Lane (2004) note "Many times, a family branch that is not as involved feels as
though an inside group has taken unfair advantage of the family business by
reaping greater benefits for its own branch” (page 12). The possibility of
agency conflicts in the context of multifamily firms is also discussed in
intergroup theory that is primarily concerned with discords (Tajfel 1982a, b,
Tagiuri and Davis 1996) between in-groups (‘us’) and out-groups (‘them’). This
theory suggests that whenever two or more groups come together, one will try
to overpower the other to either gain control or acquire an advantage over the
other, which inevitably results in conflicts (Tajfel and Turner 1979).
Given that agency problems are more acute in a multifamily firm, it may be
argued that such a firm would have a greater incentive (than a single-family
firm) to reign in agency costs via mutually agreed upon formal or informal
governance system. Existing res earch supports this notion. For example,
Uhlaner et al. (2007) state Ba shift from a founder-owner-managed firm to a
multiple ownership structure may result in immediate demands for more ac
countability and in turn, more formal governance mechanisms” (p. 23). While
describing stages of family business evolution (see Appendix 1), Jaffe and Lane
(2004) classify family partnership as Generation 2 (maturing business) that
requires an informal board and Generation 3 (family dynasty) that requires a
formal board with outsiders. The authors suggest that appropriate governance
structures are needed to optimize these relationships.
In this paper, our first objective is to investigate if multifamily firms do
indeed have a better governance structure than single-family firms. There is
plenty of evidence in the finance literature of a positive relationship between
the quality of a firm’s governance system and its performance, especially for
publicly-held firms. SLDB report similar results pertaining to smaller private
firms as well. If indeed the multifamily firms are associated with better gover
nance, the logical question that follows is whether these firms outperform single
family firms. Thus, the second objective of the paper is to answer this question.
Even if a strong positive association between multifamily ownership and the firm
performance is found, the result does not necessarily imply that the superior
performance is an outcome of a superior governance system. Consequently, our
parallel objective is to investigate whether the superior performance of the multi
family firms is a direct result of their superior governance structure.
Based on the above discussion, we formulate the following hypotheses:
1.

2.

Governance structure of a multifamily firm is superior to that of a single-family
firm;
Multifamily firms are better performers than single-family firms; and the superior
performance is a direct result of the higher quality of corporate governance.

Employing a hand-collected sample of private family-owned small firms in India we
test the hypotheses posed above and find that multifamily firms significantly outper
form single-family firms and the superior performance is attributable to the better
governance system of the former group.
The paper proceeds along the following lines. In section II, we present methodology
of the paper, including the sample, variables and data. Section III discusses results,
while Section IV concludes.

2 Sample, variables, data & methodology
2.1 Sample
Our sample covers unlisted family-owned small firms (UFOSFs) in India and
provides a distinct laboratory to perform our experiment. The UFOSFs are
scattered all over India. However, since the information needed for our paper
had to be hand collected, we limit our sample to the firms that belong in the
provinces closer to the university where one of the authors teaches. Students of
this university administered a questionnaire in person during their 2011 summer
internship program. Our final sample consists of 83 firms of which 51 are
single-family firms and 32 are multifamily firms.4
In Jaffe and Lane (2004) paradigm (Appendix 1), our single-family firms fall in
Generation 1, which are entrepreneurships with founder-managers, and multifamily
firms fall in a broader spectrum of Generation 2, which are family partnerships owned
and managed by sibling teams. Although small, our sample closely mirrors, to the
extent possible, the UFOSF population, especially in terms of geographical, demo
graphical, cultural, and industrial diversities. Appendix II shows that the sample
represents all five geographical regions of India.
Table 1 presents selected characteristics of the sample firms. Assets are below 100
million Indian rupees (INR) for 59 sample firms (42 single-family and 17 multi
family), between 100 million and 500 million INR for 14 firms (4 single-family and
10 multifamily), and greater than 500 million INR for the remaining 10 firms (5
single-family and 5 multifamily). Fifty firms in the sample are from manufacturing
industries such as chemicals, consumer goods, steel and textiles, 22 are involved in
the services activities such as financial services, hotels, and packaging, and 11 from
other industries. Although not shown in the table, the ownership of multifamily
firms is divided equally among all of the families, perhaps signifying that the owners
are direct descendants of the founder.

4 Private family-owned firms in India has so far been outside the scope of academic investigation as prior
studies such as Khanna and Palepu (2000) and Gopalan et al. (2007) examine publicly-listed Indian firms that
are usually larger and with scattered ownership structure.

Table 1

Ownership by the asset size and industry type
Single-family Multifamily Two families Three families More than
Total
three families

All firms

51

32

5

7

20

83

Below 100 million INR 42

17

3

5

9

59

10

2

1

7

14

5

0

1

4

10

Asset classes
100-500 million INR

4

Above 500 million INR 5

Industries
Manufacturing

38

12

2

3

7

50

Services

9

13

3

3

7

22

Others

4

7

0

1

6

11

Exchange rates: March 2008: 1USD = 40.22 INR March 2009: 1USD = 51.18 INR March 2010: 1USD =
45.48 INR

This table shows the ownership structure of the 83 sample firms. Also presented are the distribution of these
firms in categories defined by total assets and industries, respectively

2.2 Variables
2.2.1 Performance measures

In the absence of market performance measures, such as market-to-book ratio, we
employ accounting measures of performance — return on assets (ROA) and return on
equity (ROE). These two popular accounting measures in finance research are defined
below.

&
&

ROA: Net income/average total assets, where average assets are the sum of the
start-of-the-year and the end-of-the-year assets divided by 2;
ROE: Net income/average equity, where average equity is the sum of the start-ofthe-year and the end-of-the-year equity divided by 2.

2.2.2 Governance measures

Jaffe and Lane (2004) relate an ad hoc and implicit governance system to Generation 1
family firms, an informal board and implicit system to Generation 2 and board with
outsiders and formal policies to Generation 3 family firms. They identify the following
characteristics of good governance: absence of duality, bigger board size, greater
number and proportion of independent board members. We add one more dimension
to the parameters suggested by Jaffe and Lane (2004) which is the presence of
outsider(s) on the audit committee. These variables are elaborated below.
Duality It occurs when a firm’s CEO plays dual roles as the Chair of the
board. Duality is likely to be a common phenomenon for single-family firms.

Daily and Dalton (1992), among others, comment that if "maintaining control
is imperative , ...... , it seems likely that the founder-manager would elect to
serve as both CEO and board chairperson. To do otherwise invites some risk
of divided authority” (p. 378). A multifamily firm, on the other hand, will
likely avoid duality lest it should lead to concentration of power to one family
who might use it in detriment of the interests of other families, especially in
the absence of an independent board. Thus, we predict that multifamily firms
will exhibit a lower incidence of duality (i.e., higher incidences of positions
of CEO and Chairman being held by two separate persons) than single-family
firms.
Theoretical predictions and/or empirical results on the impact of duality on
the performance of large publicly-traded firms are mixed. Fama and Jensen
(1983), Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) argue that the effect of
duality is negative because it lessens board’s ability to monitor the CEO.
Similarly, D aily and Dalton ( 1 992) refer to duality as one of the
"dysfunctional” preferences of the founder-manager.5 Jaffe and Lane (2004)
too suggest that absence of duality is a sign of good governance. Contrarily,
proponents of duality argue that its impact of on firm performance is positive
since it promotes an unambiguous leadership and reduces information costs
(Anderson and Anthony 1986; Brickley et al. 1997). Berg and Smith 1978,
Chaganti et al. 1985, among others, find firm performance to be independent of
the duality structure.
Whether duality reduces or augments agency problems in a multifamily firm
is a subject of debate as well. On one hand, duality might lead to concentration
of power to one family who might use it in detriment of the interests of other
families, especially in the absence of an independent board. On the other hand,
by selecting the same family to serve in both positions might signify wellplaced confidence and trust other families have in this family: the confidence
should be reflected in the improved performance of the firm. Because of
opposing arguments, we refrain from predicting the sign of duality and allow
it to be determined empirically.
Independent directors A single-family firm is likely to have fewer if any,
independent board members. According to Daily and Dalton (1992), notwith
standing "the series of recommendations advocating an independent board
structure and the addition of outside board members, the founder CEO may
perceive such a strategy as potentially threatening” (p. 378). Thus, the board of
a founder-managed firm is less likely to be represented by independent
members.
The presence of independent board members, however, will be preferred by owners
of multifamily firms to reduce the possibility of one family from taking advantage of
another. Jaffe and Lane (2004) recommend representation of independent members on
the board of multifamily businesses. Thus, we expect that the board of multifamily

5 Daily and Dalton (1992), however, do not find a significant difference in the governance structure between
publicly-held founder-CEOs and non-founder-CEOs.

firms will consist of a larger percentage of independent directors than that of single
family firms.
The role of independent directors in improving the performance of a large
publicly held firm has long been a subject of debate. Some researchers (for
example, Chaganti et al. 1985; Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990, Anderson and Reeb
2003) find the role to be insignificant. Ferris et al. (2003) find that outside
directors with multiple board appointments may be too busy to mind the
businesses. Indeed, Vance (1968) reports that it is the firm with an inside
dominated board that performs better than an outside dominated board. On
the other hand, Bhagat et al. (2008) suggest that independent directors are the
crucial monitoring mechanism that might contribute to better firm performance
and Nguyen and Nielsen (2010) offer specific evidence to indicate that inde
pendent directors improve a firm’s performance.
In regard to small businesses, Jaffe and Lane (2004) comment that an
independent board is "a key business source for successful operations” (p.
14). Vance (1983), among others, argues that outside directors provide a
monitoring function. However, the board of a founder-managed firm is less
likely to be represented by independent members. Even when Bindependent”
members are represented on the board, it is not sure if it will have its intended
impact on the firm’s performance: Castaldi and Wortman (1984) suggest that
the owner-manager might not embrace the advice of the outside board mem
bers. Owners of a multifamily firm have the incentive to seek out independent
board members to lessen the agency problem. The monitoring functions of
independent directors will likely lead to these firms performing better than
single-family firms. We measure independent director (%Outside directors) as
the percentage of independent board members relative to the total number of
members on the board.
Board size The argument advanced Daily and Dalton (1992) about founderCEO’s reluctance to invite outside board members equally applies to size of
the board: a single-family firm is likely to prefer a board that is small and
often in compliance with the owner’s decision. In comparison, multifamily
firms would likely have a larger board than that of single-family firms.
There are at least two reasons in favor of this argument. First, the bigger
board size inevitably re sults from the greater need for independent directors
in a multifamily firm. Second, it is highly likely that each family in a
multifamily firm would put its own representative on the board, making
the board size larger.
The extant work predominantly suggests that smaller board size is more
effective than larger board size, especially for publicly-held firms because the
problems with coordination and processing overwhelm the advantages gained
from having more people to draw on (Steiner (1971) and Gersick and Hack
man (1990)). Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest that large boards can be less
effective than small boards, and recommend limiting the size to seven or eight
people on the board. Jensen (1993) suggests that larger board size could be
detrimental to efficient decision making, thus entailing an adverse impact on
the firm performance. Two main sources of the potential negative effect are

a) increasing problems of communication and coordination and b) decreasing
the ability of the board to monitor managerial actions.
Empirical results have generally been consistent with a negative relation between the
board size and firm performance (e.g., Yermack 1996; Eisenberg et al. 1998; Mak and
Kusnadi 2005, Sanda et al. 2005) in the context of publicly-held firms. Eisenberg et al.
(1998) find a negative correlation between board size and performance for small firms with
small boards in Finland. Dimopouslos and Wagner (2010) assert that board size plays an
important role in whether firm-level governance matters or not in improving firm perfor
mance following CEO turnover. Although the overwhelming evidence points to a positive
association between performance and smaller board size, the evidence is not unanimous. For
example, Faleye (2003) does not find significant differences in the sensitivity of CEO
turnover to performance based on the board size. Faleye suggests that both small and large
boards are likely to terminate the CEO when faced with significant and consistent deterio
ration in performance.
Turning to private firms, Dalton et al. (1999) provide "systematic evidence of
nonzero, positive, true population estimates of board size-performance relationships”
(p.674). Jaffe and Lane (2004) too characterize larger board as an indicator of good
governance. Based on Jaffe and Lane (2004) and Coles et al. (2008), we predict a
positive relationship between a multifamily firm and its board size and therefore, its
performance. We measure the board size by the number of members on the board.

of an audit committee in the context of
Indian firms, by and large, can be summarized as: (1) oversight of financial reporting
and accounting, (2) oversight of the external auditor, (3) oversight of regulatory
compliance, (4) monitoring the internal control process and (5) oversight of risk
management.
The same reason as to why multifamily firms choose higher outside representation on the
board might equally apply to their preference for outside representation on the audit
committee as the presence of outsiders on the audit committee is also a sign of independence
of the committee, since outsiders generally do not depend on the management for promotion
or other such benefits. We believe that multifamily firms are more likely than single-family
firms to seek out an outsider on the audit committee as a means to counteract potential inter
family conflicts.
Outsiders in audit committee play a significant role in ensuring good governance
practices. Anderson et al. (2004) observe that firms with exclusively independent audit
committees have lower debt financing costs. We hypothesize that the presence of an
external auditor(s) would be positively related to the performance of this firm. Given
the nearly invariant size of auditing committee, we construct a dummy variable that
takes on the value of 1 if the firm has an outsider on the audit committee (Outsiders on
the Audit Committee), and 0 otherwise.
Based on the discussions above, we provide below a summary of the predicted
relationship between the organization and the governance structure it chooses as well as
between the chosen structure and the performance of this organization.
Outsiders6 on the audit committee The role

6 We use the two terms Bindependent” and "outsider” interchangeably.

Governance
Variables

Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 2

Duality

An MF would be characterized by the
absence of duality.

The effect of duality on the MF’s performance
needs to be empirically determined.

Independent
Director

An MF’s board would consist of a larger Greater presence of independent directors would
percentage of independent directors.
be positively associated with the performance
of the MF..

Board Size

The board size of an MF would be
larger than that of a SF.

Greater board size will be positively associated
with the performance of an MF.

Outsider on
Audit
Committee

The audit committee of an MF would
contain an outsider(s).

The presence of independent auditors would be
positively correlated with the performance of an
MF.

MF = Multifamily; SF = Single-family
2.2.3 Control variables

In order to isolate the contributions of the governance variables on the firm’s perfor
mance, we also control for other variables that might influence a firm’s performance.
These variables are defined below.
Firm size The effect of a firm’s size on its performance has been a subject of
debate. On one hand, the greater size allows the firm greater economies of
scale and negotiating power, lowering the cost of capital, and improving the
firm performance. On the other hand, the bigger the size of the firm, the greater
is the potential for information asymmetry between managers and owners and
thus increased chances for exploitation by managers. The net effect of the size
on a firm’s performance could be either positive or negative. Maury (2006)
reports that the size of the firm has a positive effect on its performance, while
Majumdar (1997) documents that in India, larger firms are more profitable but
less productive than smaller counterparts. We measure asset size by the loga
rithm of total assets of the firm.
Firm age A firm’s age is related to its lifecycle which might impact a firm’s
growth potential and its performance. There is limited evidence in the literature
on how the age affects a firm’s performance. Loderer and Waelchli (2010)
indicate a weak negative relationship between firm age and profitability.
Majumdar (1997) finds that Indian companies become more productive but less
profitable as they age.

Manufacturing firm dummy Much of the firm performance depends on the nature of its
principal economic activity. The dummy variable takes on a value of one if a firm
operates in the manufacturing sector, and zero otherwise.
Table 2 provides definitions of the variables used in this study.

Table 2 Variable definitions

Variable

Definition

Ownership
Multifamily firm dummy

A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for a multifamily firm,
and the value of 0 for a single-family firm.

Performance
Return on assets (ROA)

Net income/average total assets, where assets is the average of the
levels at the start and the end of a year.

Return on equity (ROE)

Net income/average total equity, where equity is the average of the
levels at the start and the end of a year.

Corporate governance

Duality

A dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the CEO and the board
chairperson are from the same family, and 0 otherwise.

%Outside directors

Proportion of outside (i.e., unrelated to families) directors on the board.

Board size

Number of directors on a firm’s board.

Outsiders on auditing committee A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has outsiders
on the audit committee, and 0 otherwise.
Other firm characteristic

Firm size

Log of the total assets.

Firm age

Age of the firm (in years).

Manufacturing firm dummy

A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for a manufacturing firm
and 0 otherwise.

This table provides the description of variables used in the paper.

2.3 Data

The data for this paper are hand-collected from responses of CEOs (or Board
Chairs) of 83 USOSFs to a pretested questionnaire. The questionnaire consists
of data items that help us capture useful information about these sample firms
during 2008-2010. We collect four types of information: a) the ownership
structure, such as whether the firm is owned by a single family or multiple
families, b) general firm characteristics such as industry, age, and size, c)
accounting information to estimate profitability, i.e., ROA and ROE, and d)
governance proxies, such as board size, number of outside directors, and
outsiders on audit committee.
2.4 Methodology

We use both univariate and multivariate procedures to test our hypotheses. In
terms of multivariate procedures, we first estimate the models using OLS with
clustered standard errors. In the event we find that multifamily firms outperform

single-family firms, we need to show that the superior performance is owed to
their better governance structure. In so doing, we employ a mediation model in
which the ownership structure determines the governance choice, which in turn
influences performance. In principle, mediation is believed to exist when the
causal effect of an independent variable (X) on a dependent variable (Y) is
transmitted by a mediator (M). The Graphical representation of mediation is as
follows.

X

a
------------ ►

M

b
------------►

Y

The intervening variable M mediates between the explanatory variable X and
the dependent variable Y. Paths a and b are the direct effects. The meditational
effect as X leads to Y through M, is the indirect effect. The indirect effect
represents the fraction of the relationship between X and Y that is mediated by
M. In order to test for mediation, Baron and Kenny (1986) propose a four-step
model in which regressions are run and the significance of the coefficients is
examined at each step:
Step 1:
To run a regression analysis with X predicting Y to test for path c alone using the
equation:

Υ = β0 + β1+ + ε

Step 2:
To run a regression analysis with M predicting Y to test for the significance of the path
b using the equation:

y =

β0 + β±Μ

+

ε

b
Μ

---------------------------------------------------- >Y

Step 3:
To run a regression analysis with X predicting M to test for the path a using the
equation:

Step 4:
To run a regression analysis with X and M predicting Y b using the equation:

3 Results
3.1 Summary statistics

We report in Table 3 the summary statistics of the variables employed in this paper. The
sample firms, in general, exhibit high operating performance, with the ROA and ROE
is averaging 0.277 and 0.575, respectively. Considerable variations though exist across
firms, with ROA ranging from 0.01 to 0.96 and ROE ranging from 0.02 to 1.93. An
average board has 7 directors, out of which only 1.4 are from outside the owning
families. The proportion of outside directors ranges from 0.173, and 0.333, with some
firms having no outside directors. On average, the auditing committee has less than one
outsider. Duality prevails in 59% of firms in our sample. Firm age ranges from 3 years
to 40 years, with the average being 14 years. Nearly 80% of sample firms operate in the
manufacturing industry.
Table 4 shows the correlation coefficients among variables. The following observa
tions are worth noting. First, both ROA and ROE are positively correlated with the
multifamily dummy. Second, governance measures also relate positively to perfor
mance measures. Third, a positive relationship exists between the percentage of
outsiders and the board size on one hand, and with the presence of outside auditors
on the other. Fourth, the firm size is negative, while the firm’s age and manufacturing

Table 3 Descriptive statistics

Mean

Median

Std Dev

Minimum

Maximum

0.386

0

0

0

1

ROA

0.277

0.210

0.208

0.010

0.960

ROE

0.575

0.480

0.361

0.020

1.930

Duality

0.578

1

0.495

0

1

Ownership structure
Multifamily firm dummy

Firm Performance

Corporate Governance

%Outside directors

0.173

0.2

0.109

0

0.333

Board size

7.120

7

3.109

3

15

Outsiders on auditing committee

0.578

1

0.495

0

1

Firm characteristics
Total assets (million INR)

698

278

777

96

3145

Firm age

14.18

11

8.48

3

40

Manufacturing firm dummy

0.795

1

0.404

0

1

Exchange rates: March 2008: 1USD = 40.22 INR March 2009: 1USD = 51.18 INR March 2010: 1USD =
45.48 INR

This table presents the descriptive statistics of main variables used in the paper. Ownership structure is
represented by a dummy variable that is equal to one for multifamily firms and zeroes otherwise. Firm
performance is measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Governance variables
include board size, the number of outside directors on the board, the number of outside directors on the
auditing committee, and a dummy variable that is equal to one if a founding family member assumes both the
CEO and board Chair positions, and zero otherwise. Firm characteristics are total assets, firm age, and whether
the firm is in the manufacturing industry

affiliation are positively related to performance measures. Finally, the multifamily
dummy relates positively to all variables with the exceptions of duality and firm size.
The negative relation of the dummy with duality suggests that the duality is more
common to single-family firms.
Table 4 Correlations

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(1)

ROA

(2)

ROE

0.85

(3)

Multifamily dummy

0.40

0.29

(4)

Duality

0.24

0.26

-0.23

(5)

%Outside directors

0.51

0.56

0.15

0.00

(6)

Board size

0.85

0.91

0.37

0.22

0.56

(7)

Outsiders auditing

0.63

0.71

0.28

0.16

0.48

0.75

(8)

Log(assets)

-0.30

-0.21

-0.67

0.26

-0.03

0.28

-0.22

(9)

Firm age

0.33

0.28

0.32

0.17

-0.01

0.30

0.29

-0.19

(10)

Manufacturing dummy

0.17

0.15

0.22

-0.07

0.15

0.23

0.17

-0.08

(9)

0.12

3.2 Testing hypothesis 1: Governance structure— single-family vs. multifamily
firms
3.2.1 Univariate analysis

The Univariate results reported in Table 5 show the differences in the governance
structures between the two groups. Compared to single-family firms, multifamily firms
have larger boards (8.6 directors vs. 6.2 directors on average), more outside directors on
board (1.87 vs 1.14 on average) and more outsiders in the auditing committee (.75 vs.
0.47), and these differences are all statistically significant at the 1% level. The results of
differences in median tests replicate the results of the differences in mean tests. To sum
up, the results in Table 5 are in line with our expectations about the governance systems
pertaining to the two groups of families.
Table 5 also presents the performance comparison between single-family and
multifamily firms in our sample. First and foremost, multifamily firms significantly
outperform their single-family counterparts regardless of the measure. The average
ROA and ROE are 0.211 and 0.493, respectively, for single-family firms, and 0.382
and 0.706, respectively, for multifamily firms. The medians are 0.150 and 0.325,
respectively, for single-family firms, but much higher at 0350 and 0.770 for multifamily
firms. The across-group differences in both the mean and median are statistically
significant at the 1 % level.
3.2.2 Multivariate analyses

To perform multivariate analyses, we run regressions of Indian UFOSFs’ operating
performance on its ownership structure and governance to tease out what drives the
better performance of multifamily firms. Dependent variables are ROA and ROE,
respectively. Control variables include the firm’s size, age, and industry affiliation.
We employ three specifications: Specification (1) uses only ownership structure and
control variables as independent variables, specification (2) uses only governance and
control variables as independent variables, and specification (3) uses all variables. This
design helps reveal which, ownership structure or governance, drives the discrepancy in
performance across single- and multifamily firms. The models are estimated using OLS
with clustered standard errors. Table 6 reports estimation results.
The foremost observation is that the ownership structure loads positively in the
specification (1) but does not load in the specification (3), while governance variables
have very similar coefficients with similar statistical significance across specifications
(2) and (3), especially with respect to ROA. In particular, in the specification (1) the
multifamily dummy receives a positive coefficient of 0.108 in the ROA regression and
0.130 in the ROE regression, both statistically significant at the 10% level, indicating
superior performance of multifamily to single-family firms. In specification (2), out of
the four governance measures, board size and percent of outside directors have
statistically significant coefficients with a positive sign.
In specification (3) when both ownership structure and governance variables are
included, the coefficient of ownership declines to 0.043 in the ROA regression and0.012 in the ROE regression, neither significantly different from zero. In contrast, board
size, percent of outside directors and duality all have coefficients that barely changed

Table 5 Comparison of single-family vs. multifamily firms

Mean
Single-family

Median

Multitamily

Test for different means

t

Pr>t

Single-family

Multifamily

Test for different medians

z

Pr>Z

Performance

ROA

0.211

0.382

6.06

< 0.001

0.150

0.325

3.56

< 0.001

ROE

0.493

0.706

4.46

< 0.001

0.350

0.770

4.21

< 0.001

Corporate governance
Duality

0.667

0.438

3.64

<0.001

1

1

3.56

<0.001

Outside directors

1.138

1.875

4.77

< 0.001

1

2

3.72

< 0.001

Board size

6.216

8.563

6.05

< 0.001

5

8.5

4.43

< 0.001

Outsiders on auditing committee

0.471

0.750

4.50

< 0.001

0

1

4.34

< 0.001

15.67

13.85

14.60

< 0.001

15.28

14.08

-9.83

< 0.001

Firm characteristics
Log(assets)

Firm age

12.02

17.63

4.84

< 0.001

8

18

3.88

< 0.001

Manufacturing firm dummy

0.726

0.906

3.85

< 0.001

1

1

3.43

< 0.001

This table presents the differences between single-family and multifamily firms in operating performance, corporate governance and other characteristics. ROA and ROE measure
operating performance, a multifamily firm is a dummy that takes on a value of 1, corporate governance variables are represented by the board size, the proportion of outside directors on
the board, presence of outsiders on the auditing committee, and duality (whether the CEO and board Chair are from the same family). Control variables are the firm’s size, age, and
industrial affiliation. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Table 2. Means and medians of the variables are reported and their differences across the groups are tested using the
two-sample t-test and the Mann Whitney U test, respectively

Table 6 Ownership structure, corporate governance, and operating performance

Dependent Variable

ROA

1 1)
Multifamily firm dummy

ROE

(3)

(1)

0.108*

0.043

0.130*

-0.012

(0.059)

(0.032)

(0.075)

(0.047)

(2)

(2)

(3)

Governance Variables

Duality
%Outside directors
Board size

Outsiders on auditing committee

0.043

0.048*

0.038

(0.027)

(0.027)

(0.033)

(0.031)

0.208*

0.201*

0.261

0.263

(0.108)

(0.110)

(0.178)

(0.180)

0.041***

0.040***

0.097***

0.097***

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.012)

(0.012)

0.039

0.039

0.037

0.036

(0.033)

(0.033)

(0.054)

(0.054)

0.004

0.037

Firm Characteristics
Log(Assets)

Firm age

Manufacturing firm dummy

Intercept

-0.014

-0.017*

-0.009

-0.012

0.006

(0.020)

(0.010)

(0.011)

(0.036)

(0.011)

(0.014)

0.005**

0.002

0.001

0.009**

0.001

0.001

(0.003)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.004)

(0.002)

(0.002)

-0.054*

0.044

-0.008

-0.013

0.071

-0.056*

(0.039)

(0.020)

(0.022)

(0.074)

(0.030)

(0.031)

0.300

0.109

-0.020

0.494

-0.286

-0.249

(0.313)

(0.154)

(0.179)

(0.568)

(0.176)

(0.239)

Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

R2

0.226

0.760

0.764

0.133

0.843

0.843

This table presents the regression of Indian family firms’ operating performance on their ownership structures
and governance. ROA and ROE measure operating performance, a multifamily firm is a dummy that takes on
a value of 1, governance variables are represented by the board size, the proportion of outside directors on the
board, presence of outsiders on the on the auditing committee, and duality (whether the CEO and board Chair
are from the same family). Control variables are the firm’s size, age, and industrial affiliation. Detailed variable
definitions are provided in Table 2. The model is estimated using OLS, with clustered standard errors reported
under the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** mark statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels,
respectively

across specifications. Among these governance variables, board size receives coeffi
cients that are positive and statistically significant at the 1 % level in both ROA and
ROE regressions. The proportion of outsiders on the board and duality7 both obtain
positive coefficients in the ROA regressions that are statistically significant at the 10%
level. The combined evidence in Table 6 indicates that governance, and not the
ownership structure itself, drives the performance difference between single-family
and multifamily firms.

7 Selection of the member(s) of the same family to perform both CEO and board chair functions might reflect
the trust other families have for the superior management skills of the entrusted family.

The R2’s of the regressions are informative of the explanatory power of the models.
In specification (1), the R2 is 0.226 in the ROA regression and 0.133 in the ROE
regression. In specifications (2) and (3) where governance variables are introduced, the
R2 jumps to a much higher level (between 0.76 and 0.84), indicating that governance
contributes a great majority of the explanatory power of the set of explanatory
variables.
Out of the control variables, the coefficient of firm size is significant (at the
10% level) and negative only in the specification (2) with ROA as the dependent
variable, meaning that as size increases the performance deteriorates for multi
family firms. A firm’s age loads positively and significantly in the specification
(1) for both ROA and ROE. However, its effects on the firm’s performance appear
to be subsumed by governance factors in the specification (2) or (3). Thus, neither
size nor age is the main determinant of firm performance. The coefficient of
manufacturing firms dummy is not different from zero in the ROA regression
but is negative and statistically significant in the ROE regression in the presence
of governance variables. This particular finding might serve as further evidence
that effect of better governance of multifamily firms is strong enough to outweigh
the negative performance of manufacturing firms that are more intensely (90%)
populated by multifamily firms.
To sum up, the multivariate analysis shows that a multifamily firm’s better gover
nance system, and not the ownership structure, is what drives its superior performance.
Specifically, larger board, a greater presence of outside directors on the board, and a
higher number of members on the audit committee help strike a balance of power
among all related families and promotes the common objective of maximizing the
firm’s profit.
3.3 Mediation model

To verify the indirect effect of multifamily ownership structure on firm performance via
corporate governance system installed, we perform a robustness check using the
conditional mediation approach. Following Baron and Kenny (1986), we formulate
our analysis by running the following four-stage regressions:

(1)

where μ is firm-specific fixed effects; vt is time-fixed effects; and Ɛ is the unobservable
error term.

(2)

(3)
and,

(4)
Table 7 reports the results of the regressions. Board size, outside directors, and duality
have a significant positive influence on ROA and ROE of the firms, shown in columns
1, 4, 5, and 8. Results in columns 2 and 6 suggest that a multifamily firm is associated a
larger board and a lower likelihood of that both CEO and board Chairperson come from
the same family. Columns 3 and 7 exhibit a significantly positive relationship between the
multifamily firm and performance. Finally, columns 4 and 8 report a significantly positive
impact on the combined governance and multifamily firm on the firm’s performance.
To sum up, first, the larger the board size the better is the performance (significant at
the 1% level) in all specifications. Second, a greater percentage of outside directors is
significantly positively related to the performance. Finally, the duality imparts a positive
effect in the case of multifamily firms. In general, the results of robustness tests confirm
that a better governance system designed to reduce agency problems for a multifamily
private firm serves its intended purpose by contributing positively to its performance.
3.4 Endogeneity issue

Endogeneity notoriously inflicts most governance research in the forms of simultaneity or
omitted variables (Roberts and Whited 2013). A similar concern might be expressed
about our research. A relevant question is: does multifamily ownership, improve the
performance oris it the improved performance that attracts more families to the firm? Jaffe
and Lane (2004) depict a clear picture of the transition from a single-family to a
multifamily firm. The family business starts with the founder as the owner/manager, then
it takes on the partnership form as it is passed on to succeeding generations, and finally,
the business becomes a holding company with diversified assets owned by family
branches. The existence of this succession process is borne out by the fact that the
ownerships are equally divided among all owning families in our sample of multifamily
firms. In short, it is the succession within and not the entry from outside that determines
the ownership structure of family-owned private firms in India. Thus, simultaneity does
not appear to be a concern for our study. In spite of controlling for firm size, age, and
industry classification, all known as important determinants of firm performance, we
cannot rule out the possibility of the omitted variables bias. Absent publicly available data,
we admit that this list of control variables is probably not exhaustive.

Table 7 Mediation effect of ownership structure through governance

Direction of
mediation—>

Governance
—>ROA

Governance
—>Multifamily
firm

Multifamily
firm >ROA

Governance &
Multifamily firm
—>ROA

Governance
—>ROE

Governance
>\Multifamily
firm

Multifamily
firm >ROE

Governance &
Multifamily firm
—>ROE

Dependent variable

ROA

Multifamily firm

ROA

ROA

ROE

Multifamily firm

ROE

ROE

<1>

<2)

<3)

<4)

<5)

(6)

(7)

0.045***

-0.159

0.052***

0.048**

-0.159

(0.013)

(0.008)

(0.013)

(0.018)

(0.008)

(0.006)

0.075***

0.016***

0.074***

0.071***

0.016***

0.070***

(0.011)

(0.004)

(0.011)

(0.019)

(0.004)

(0.015)

0.022***

0.028***

0.021***

0.070***

0.028***

0.071***

(0.005)

(0.002)

(0.005)

(0.011)

(0.002)

(0.006)

0.025

-0.016

0.025

0.057*

-0.016

0.057*

(0.017)

(0.010)

(0.018)

(0.032)

(0.010)

(0.004)

Duality

%Outside directors

Board Size

Outsiders on auditing
committee
Multifamily firm dummy

Log(Assets)

Firm Age

0.116***

0.039**

0.145***

0.022**

(0.0005)

(0.018)

(0.061)

(0.012)

-0.017***

—0.197***

-0.012

-0.010

0.007

—0.197***

-0.009

0.002

(0.004)

(0.010)

(0.288)

(0.006)

(0.006)

(0.010)

(0.021)

(0.006)

0.002**

0.011***

0.005***

0.001*

0.006

0.011***

0.008***

0.008

(0.0009)

(0.0005)

(0.001)

(0.0008)

(0.001)

(0.0005)

(0.002)

(0.0002)

0.202**

3.063***

0.342*

0.084

-0.207*

3.063***

0.538

-0.169

(0.08)

(0.168)

(0.185)

(0.098)

(0.111)

(0.168)

(0.340)

(0.104)

Year fixed effects

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

R2

0.787

0.529

0.219

0.780

0.849

0.529

0.126

0.844

Obs

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

Intercept

i

(8)
0.044***

This table reports the results of the moderation regressions to show the moderation effect of the multifamily firm as a causal link between governance variables and the firm performance
variables - ROA, and ROE. Column (1) and (5) show the results of Eq. (1) as impact runs from governance to firm performance. Column (2) and ((6) show the results of Eq. (3) where
the impact runs from governance to multifamily firm. Col (3) and (7) show the results of Eq. (2) as the impact runs from multifamily firm to firm performance. Finally, Col (4) and (8)
show the results of Eq. (4) as the combined impact the impact runs from governance & multifamily firm to firm performance. The results are based on Panel Least Squares and fixed
effects. We employ panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) estimates assuming that the disturbances are, by default, heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across panels.
The coefficient values are followed by the standard errors in the parentheses. *, **, and *** mark statistical significance at the 1,5, and 10% levels, respectively

4 Conclusion
A private firm owned and managed by a single-family should not have owner-manager
conflicts. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that a formal governance mechanism is
not only unnecessary but likely to impair this firm’s performance. Opponents of this
view argue that even though an owner-managed firm does not suffer from conflicts
between the owner and the manager, it still incurs other agency costs, such as altruism,
which in the absence of an appropriate governance mechanism should negatively affect
its financial performance. A private firm owned and managed by multiple families is
exposed to additional agency problems because of inter-family conflicts, but it has the
incentive to institute an appropriate governance system to reduce these conflicts. Based
on the empirical evidence supporting a positive association between a firm’s gover
nance system and its performance, we predict that a multifamily firm, owing to its
better governance system, will outperform its single-family counterpart.
Employing hand-collected data from a sample of 83 small, unlisted, family-owned
firms in India, we demonstrate that multifamily firms indeed institute more efficient
governance mechanisms than their single-family counterparts and perform better than
the latter group. The multivariate analyses show that a multifamily firm’s better
governance system, and not its ownership structure, is what drives its superior perfor
mance. Specifically, larger board, a greater presence of outside directors on the board,
and a higher number of members on the audit committee help strike a balance of power
among all related families and promote the common objective of maximizing the firm’s
profit. Another important finding of the paper is that duality, although significantly less
prevalent than single-family firms, makes a positive contribution to the performance of
multifamily firms. Overall, the paper demonstrates the efficacy of governance system in
a business organization, even in a privately-held owner-managed firm.

Appendix 1. Stages of Family Business Evolution

Generation

G1: Entrepreneur

G2: Family
Partnership

Business form

Entrepreneurship

Maturing business Holding company or family office with
diversified assets

Mode of control Founder/owner/manager Sibling team

G3: Business Dynasty

Family branches

Strategy

Personal vision

Renew business

Sustain profitability; generate new wealth

Governance
structure

ad hoc, implicit

Informal board,
implicit

Board with outsiders, formal policies

Source: Jaffe and Lane, Family Business Review, Vol. XVII, No. 1, March 2004.

Appendix 2. Regional Distribution of the Sample
This table provides geographical distribution of the 83 UFOSFs. The sample consists of
UFOSFs from 18 provinces in all the five regions of India. The number of firms in each
province is shown in parentheses.
Central Region

Eastern Region

Western Region

Northern Region

Southern Region

Chhattisgarh (2)

Assam (3)

Gujarat (7)

Haryana (4)

Andhra Pradesh (5)

Jharkhand (2)

Bihar (2)

Maharashtra (9)

Himachal Pradesh (2)

Karnataka (4)

Madhya Pradesh (4)

Orissa (3)

Rajasthan (4)

Punjab (8)

Kerala (4)

Uttar Pradesh (6)

Tamil Nadu (4)

Total (20)

Total (17)

West Bengal 10)

Total (8)

Total (18)

Total (20)
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